[MUSIC] [MUSIC] We have outlined the major components of the analytical framework: resources, uses and the different rules that make up public or private law. The objective of this section is to understand the meaning of this regime, the framework of the regime, which actually allows us to explain how users behave. So the authors who developed this framework identified several regulatory processes, which are demonstrated by the four arrows in the diagram. The first is public policy regulation, shown by arrow number one, by public policies without having an impact on property rights. This forces all users, be they owners or not, to conduct themselves equally vis-à-vis the resource. For example, even if we own the resource, hydrocarbons should not be dumped into a river or a stream, Today in a developed society, nobody has the right to dump a bucket of petrol into a river. That’s obvious, even for the owner. That's the first regulation, the regulation by public policy. The second regulation is still under public policy but it impacts the rights of property. This means that if the content of property rights is modified the type of use that can be made from this property is also modified. These rights severely limit use rights, for example. The authority to exploit the resource for irrigation, for example, during a summer drought are typically public policies that oblige the property rights, no matter how they were previously invoked. We witness a form of material expropriation that is to say, there is a water resource that can be used, but during a given period it can no longer be used as a result of drought and to preserve the common resource. This second type of regulation requires that even public policies which are relatively powerful with respect to property rights and, as we have already mentioned, this is not necessarily the case in all political systems of northern countries. The third type of regulation, this is regulation through redefining property rights. Defining the context that the owner may use the resource. One can take the example of a concession and it may mean revising a concession, to renegotiate or reduce the duration. In this case the availability of the right, the property right, limited in time, allows the relatively limited use of resource and once again, it is modified or altered. In this case, it is not a law, or public policy, but the concession contract which gives us the opportunity to use the resource. The fourth regulatory voice is the regulation of the redistribution of the property rights. This is undoubtedly the most aggressive voice of regulation. It helps to redistribute who owns the resource, either by nationalization of water resources either by municipalization or even through privatization. All these procedures involve dispossessing the original owner of the resource. The four main methods of regulation, through public policies without impact or an impact to property rights or through redistribution or reallocation of property rights, can then be qualified as terms of extent or coherence. The regime’s extent is its ability to effectively frame all or a certain amount of goods and services that are removed from the resource. It is the number of uses or the percentage of relative use, which is framed by the institutional regimes, public policy and property rights. This extent enables us to understand the uses that are effectively allowed or forbidden and uses that are free meaning they are not regulated at all. And, then, we will also talk about the coherence of the regime. Coherence is, above all, when there is no contradiction between public policies. We will return to this in the next module with many questions linked to intersectoriality - the fact that an agricultural public policy can be in contradiction with environmental public policy. It can happen, and above all consistency issues within the regime between the body of public law and private law, between public policy and the property rights. For example, the fact that a public policy does not contradict an inalienable property right would stall its implementation. On this basis, we can qualify the extent, the coherence of a regime and its regulatory properties, its ability to frame both uses and users. With this analysis model, we can begin to grasp a little more about user behaviour. Take the case of a river that is polluted, and that we discussed earlier in the previous section. Here is a user who pollutes the Arve river next to us. In terms of an analytical framework of institutional regimes, it can be explained in different ways. The fact that contaminants are dumped in the system is not at all regulated so the user can pollute peacefully, freely. There is no rule against this. In this case, the problem is linked to the extent of the regime, the goods and services. The fact that pollutants can be dumped in a river is not at all considered by the regime. This is either because the regime is contradictory, is not sufficiently coherent, that is to say the property rights of the polluter are so strong that he can pollute in peace without public policy preventing it. This is a problem of incoherence between the property right and the policy to be applied. There is a law but it is not respected because of the structure of property rights, or because the regime authorises pollution within a certain level and there, clearly the regime is broad and coherent, but this can explain problematic behaviour, in a certain extent with respect to the resource. However, things are not that simple. If you could explain user behaviour, with the amount of laws the framework of the regime, part of the rules activated or to be activated, the whole body of objective law. It would be too easy to consider that user behaviour whether positive or negative, is simply dependent on the ability to satisfactorily define a regime and a legal framework. Of course things are much more complicated and this is what we see with recently developed, localized arrangements of regulation which allow users some leeway within the regime. This is known as the rules in use, the rules in action which contrasts with the rules in force of the institutional regime itself. The rules in action are the rules that we will already effectively apply. They are the rules that we will circumvent or redirect, use for a purpose other than the one that was initially envisaged. They are the rules that we will add to complete the regime over time and all form an arrangement of regulations, not necessarily included within the legal framework of public policies or the private body of law of property rights but which can all explain users behaviour, whether positive or negative. The rules in action or rules in use contrast with the rules in force and define this arrangement of localized regulation. We'll see a fine example with the issue of ecosystems in the canton of Valais presented to us by Rémi Schweizer, but before that, we will pause for a moment on the example or examples of institutional resources regimes in Switzerland with Thomas Bolognesi. He will focus on the case of Switzerland before expanding to the European case and the very rich Water Framework Directive which is a successful system for framing water resource uses. is a successful system for framing water resource uses. [MUSIC] [MUSIC]
