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Aid Effectiveness
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En provenance du cours de Universiteit Leiden
Political Economy of Institutions and Development
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À partir de la leçon
Economic Development
Development Assistance. Assesses the motivations for development assistance but raises doubts about the extent to which it can overcome local issues.
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Richard Thomas GriffithsProf. dr.
Faculty of Humanities
Hi, there.
In the previous video, we saw how the United Nations
established development aid targets for the donor countries.
And we examined the real motives behind the four countries that actually reached
the norms in the 1970s that actually has stack to them ever since.
We also highlighted the link between economic and
governance structures, between foreign and domestic policy.
Well now in this video we're going to look at whether development aid is effective.
Particularly in respect to the efforts of the World Bank
which encouraged better governance.
We'll analyze this question at three levels, the evidence from econometric
studies, the comparative study on efforts to encourage voice merchantability,
and finally a local case study in water management and
reforestation in West India.
Now if there's any agreement in the literature, it's this, that aid is indeed
most effective in countries with good governance and strong institution.
And that making governance reform a condition from aid does not work.
The logical conclusion is that donor aid strategy should concentrate on countries
with good governance and strong institutions.
But if everyone did this, it would mean abandoning the very poorest people
living in weak and corrupt states, the very ones who need the help the most.
Now this brings us to what is termed the Micro-Macro paradox.
It was formulated by Paul Mosley in 1987.
And this means that aid can often be seen to help local populations in very positive
ways, even economically, but it doesn't show up in macroeconomics statistics.
More aid did not seem to lead to more growth.
It could also be that poor stagnant economies received more aid
because they needed it, because that's what aid giving is supposed to be about.
But it's equally likely that the econometric models used were incapable of
capturing and disaggregating the variables involved in explaining economic growth.
And finally, it could be because the growth data itself is rubbish.
But you never hear anybody saying that.
Meanwhile, many studies now shifted to local perspectives and they added to
a substantial literature of microeconomic success that was beginning to pile up.
But so too were the studies casting doubt on whether development aid had any effect
on growth.
Indeed, the literature has now expanded so far that there are models for
analyzing the results of the models.
And this new branch of literature suggest that in the long run,
aid does indeed contribute to growth after all.
Lots of aid, and very little growth.
Well let's leave this range of inquiry and turn to the question of governance.
Can aid agencies create the conditions for good governance?
In 2007-2008, the UK department for international development
published the results of the efforts of seven donor countries to promote voice and
accountability.
In a total of 67 development projects in which they had participated,
the donor countries were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Now they concluded that even at a micro level, the ability to improve voice and
accountability were limited and relatively isolated, and
they doubted whether any of the local successes would be scaled up.
They also found no evidence that improved voice and
accountability had aid any contribution to the alleviation of poverty or
any other of the millenium development goals.
So, why did these efforts fail?
Well, they listed several problems.
First, they made a misguided assumptions that voice and
accountability was even wanted, and
that more effective institutions would somehow become more accountable.
Secondly, they proved unable to find a strategy or
even an entry point in the complex interaction of power relations, formal and
informal institutions.
And third, there was a mistake in assumption that there was indeed one
unified but unheard voice from the poor.
And that at least among the poor, all voices would be equal but
this proved very far from the case.
And finally, they'd assumed there would be time to construct governments frameworks,
without bringing the timetable for
the implementation of the projects into difficulties.
Well, these are pretty chilling conclusions.
This is really what happens.
Well David Mosse was employed as an anthropologist on a British development
project in the hills of West India.
The project had two aims, to improve water management in the villages, and
to reverse the deforestation of the neighboring hills
that had led to the water problem in the first place.
Mosse was attached to the project as an anthropologist.
But he turned his skills to analyze his own development workers.
In 2005, he published the research in a fascinating and
painfully honest book entitled Cultivating Development.
Now how can I best convey its essence to you?
Well analytically, Mosse divided his team into what he called sociologists and
engineers.
The sociologists wanted to make sure that everyone was involved in the decisions, so
that the project would have local ownership, and
the engineers wanted to dig irrigation canals and plant trees.
And the local headman in the village wanted his work done first.
So, the sociologist held their meetings, and meetings, and even more meetings,
specially for women who didn't turn up at the other meetings.
And the engineers waited and they wanted to start work.
And the headman want everything to start with him,
which was exactly what the sociologist did not want.
And the villagers who had to keep living there long after everybody
had left didn't want to upset the headman.
So, after interminable blaze, what actually happened?
Well, the headman got his work done first.
The villagers got their water management and the reforestation was forgotten.
And the governance of the village went on just as before.
It's difficult to not being depressed when
reading the literature on aid effectiveness.
But even though academic literature is layered with resign cynicism
toward foreign aid and
foreign aid industry, it's difficult to not be impressed by the vision and
the determination of those working to improve the lot of their fellow men.
So thank you very much, Nicola, my daughter, for
showing me your work with the special needs children in Kenya.
And the wonderful people who are working with you.
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