This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!
9.3.1.1 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 1
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En provenance du cours de Tel Aviv University
The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II
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WEEK 5
The Middle East from 1967 to the present including the Arab Spring
Rencontrer les enseignants
Professor Asher SusserSenior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
[BLANK_AUDIO].
It is against this background of the political struggle between forces that
were more oriented towards tradition and
others that were oriented more towards modernity.
It is against this background that we should view this
new phenomena, which has become known as the Arab Spring.
Essentially, there are two basic paradigms that have
been used in order to explain the Arab Spring.
The most commonly used is the democracy - autocracy dichotomy.
That the Arab Spring is all about the struggle
of the forces of autocracy, against the forces of democracy.
But there is another alternative paradigm that we could use,
that is the struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition.
And, I would argue, that it is the
struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition
that is a much more relevant paradigm to
analyze the Arab Spring, rather than autocracy and democracy.
Essentially, we can see, against the background
of the Arab Spring, the emergence of
neo-traditionalist political forces that come in the
form of political Islam, sectarianism, and tribalism.
And it is these that are far more demonstratively leading in the Arab
Spring rather than the democracy, autocracy confrontation.
After all, if we look at the Egyptian example, where it is the
Muslim Brotherhood versus the army, neither of
these are exactly the epitome of democracy.
These are essentially two autocratic forces facing each other.
One of them, the Muslim Brotherhood, far
more represents the neo-traditionalist forces, and the army
on the other hand is a much
more representative organization of the forces of modernity.
If we talk about the forces of neo-traditionalism, none of them is a
force that is opposed to modernity or has not been deeply affected by it.
Indeed political Islam is unquestionably a product of the modern world,
but it is disturbed by the secularizing thrust of modernity and nationalism.
They seek, in their various ways, to
channel modernity and nationalism through a traditionalist mold
that would allow for modernization or nationalist
identity while preserving critical traditional or neo-traditional values.
And not abandoning, marginalizing, or suppressing them
in the name of secular nationalism or modernity.
These may relate to religion and to the observance of religious law, or the
preservation of sectarian and or tribal identities,
with their attendant traditions, customs, and values.
Looking at the social economic background of the
Arab Spring, it would be advisable, to go through,
the publications of the Arab human development reports
that have appeared over the last decade or so.
These are reports written by the United Nations, on Arab human development,
and they point in recent years to three deficits, from which the Arab
world tends to suffer, the deficit of political freedom.
The deficit of first world education
systems and the deficit in gender equality.
It's the combination of these three, the lack of political freedom,
the lack of first world education systems, and the lack of
gender equality, which creates poorly performing economies, where you have
not only low productivity because of very low female participation in the workforce.
But also, high levels of population growth.
This combination of poorly performing economies
that have high population growths, are
the background to the economic crisis that many Arab states find themselves in.
And in these economic crisis you have an
entire generation, those people from the age of 18
to 30, who have nothing to wait for, no expectation for a job in the near future.
No expectation even for the possibility to get married in the present circumstances.
No possibility to have a real life, therefore an entire younger generation
completely hopeless and disenchanted with the
present and the future that awaits them.
It is this period in life from the age of 18 to
30, that James Gelvin has referred to, as the period of waithood.
The younger generation in countries in the Middle East, go through
their childhood and then their boyhood and then they came this age
of 18 to 30, the age of waithood where they wait, in
hopeless expectation for something to turn up to give them a life.
It is this, sense of exasperation and hopelessness that is
at the very root of the outburst of the Arab Spring.
Much more than any particular pressure
for democratization against the authoritarian regime.
Spring has been used very commonly as a term
to explain this phenomenon of uprisings throughout the Arab world.
But Spring is a term which is, for the last
part, a misnomer, the term Spring has an European connotation.
It is referring in comparison to the Spring
of Nations in 1848 or the, the Prague
Spring of 1968, or the Spring of Nations
in eastern Europe after the fall of communism.
A Spring that ushered in secular democratic
regimes for the most part against regimes that
were very authoritarian, but this has not
been the outcome in the Middle Eastern countries.
And in the Middle Eastern countries for the most part, as mentioned
before in this challenge between the forces of modernity and tradition or
neo-tradition, it is these neo-traditional forces of Islamism and sectarian politics,
or tribal politics that have come to the fore much more than democratic regimes.
Why was spring used as a term to explain what was happening in the Arab world?
Just as there was an emphasis on this European
comparison, there was a similar emphasis in explaining the emergence of the
Arab Spring on technology such as the new media, on Facebook and Twitter.
This was a means of giving the revolutions
in the Arab world a universalist kind of character.
That is, similar to other parts of the world
and among recognition of the otherness of the other.
There is a tendency on the part
of scholars in the West, usually ideological multi-culturists.
To underrate, or even to ignore the cultural input
of the other as a valid explanatory and analytical
tool, and to obfuscate the importance of religion as
a factor in people's behavior in the Middle East.
Even though it is fairly obvious that religion
is a key marker of identity in Muslim societies.
In short, culture matters.
That is not to say, that this is
a case for Middle Eastern exceptionalism, not at all.
It is just to say that culture matters in all, cultures, in all parts of the world,
the Middle East included just as it matters in
other regions of the world and in other cultures.
And those scholars have been urged by some to be careful
not to throw out the political culture baby with the bath water.
Many have done so, and many still do.
Why the reluctance to deal with culture?
It is very much a result, of the amazing impact
of Edward Said's Orientalism, and Said's
rejection of the Orientalist emphasis on culture.
And Said in his book Orientalism, dismissed the notion
that there are geographical spaces
with indigenous radically different inhabitants,
who can be defined on the basis of some
religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space.
But as others have pointed out, this
results in the proclivity, to explain events
as if these were generic phenomena, inextricably
linked to paradigms of a universal nature.
Such universal paradigms attempt to explain
widely divergent historical developments, as if
differences in culture, time, and place,
had no vital bearing on historical outcomes.
Thus, there is this politically correct
tendency, to ignore the undercurrents of political
culture, and to focus on the more
superficial readily apparent globalized features of universalism.
Such as Facebook and Twitter, instead of the more profound
and less immediately recognizable political
under currents of Middle Eastern societies.
And we, as we have seen them in this course over the last 200 years.
The focus, therefore, in those who spoke of the Arab
Spring was on the secular Democrats and not the Islamists,
but it was the Islamists who actually rose to the
fore, very much at the expense of the secular Democrats.
There were those who said that perhaps Arab Awakening,
would have been a better term than Arab Spring.
That's an interesting term to think of, Arab Awakening.
It's not original, it's 100 years old.
Arab Awakening, is the name that was given to the
Arab nationalist awakening in the early years of the 20th Century.
That that we discussed on the eve of the
first world war, and during the fist World War.
But there is a huge difference between that Arab awakening and
the awakening now, if that is the term to be used.
The Arab awakening of the early 20th century, was essentially secular.
It was about Arab nationalism, it was about defining people in accordance with
the language they spoke, Arabic, not by their religion, Muslim or otherwise.
So the Arab awakening had a certain secular thrust in the early 20th century.
But that is hardly the case now.
When secularism, as we have seen, is very much in
retreat, and there are number of reasons for this, secular retreat.
[BLANK_AUDIO].
The path of secularism, in the late 19th and 20th centuries in the Middle East,
was very much an emulation of the West that was at the height of its power.
The height of its power and expansion, and it was the
source of this power that those who secularized, sought to emulate.
But the West in recent decades, is far less impressive, and
in economic decline both in the United States and in Europe.
It is a far less appealing example to follow
these days than it was earlier in the 20th century.
There was another great secular model to follow.
That was very much the case in the middle
of the 20th century and that was the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was this great example, of a weak country
which within the space of one generation turned into a super power.
For the Arabs who were in this urgent quest for power, prestige,
and prosperity, the Soviet Union seemed to be the ideal model to follow.
But the model of the Soviet Union collapsed in the Soviet Union itself.
And there is nothing much left of the Soviet model to follow.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly of all was the failure of Arabism.
Arabism was often or not only a movement for the
unity of the Arab people, Arabism was a secular ideology.
Arabism was the platform for the
secularization of Arab politics and society.
After all, Arabism spoke about uniting people on the basis of
the language they spoke, and not the religion to which they belonged.
But the failure of Arabism also meant the failure of this
platform of secularization, and the general weakening of the Arab states.
Against the background of this weakening of the Arab states, we see
the rise to the fore in the Middle East of the non-Arab powers.
The elevation of Turkey and Iran as regional super powers.
[BLANK_AUDIO].
These two countries, Turkey and Iran, much like the
Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire of the 19th century.
Meet in the territory of present day Iraq in their respective spheres of influence.
Turkey influential in northern Iraq, and Iran in pretty much the rest.
These are not just the spheres of influence
between these two rising powers, Turkey and Iran.
They are also the spheres of influence, Between Sunni and Shia.
Turkey being in the most powerful of the Sunni states, and Iran the leader of the
Shiite countries and the Shiite members of the Middle Eastern countries.
Iraq, like it was in the days of the Ottoman
Empire, is now the border area between the Sunni and Shia.
And it is interesting to note, that in the arrangement
of Middle Eastern alliances these days, it is not the
pro-American states against the pro-Soviet states, which is obviously very
much of an anachronism, and totally irrelevant in the present.
It is neither the monarchies versus the republics,
but the states of the Middle East organize themselves these days in alliances on the
basis of their religions affiliation, the Sunni states versus the Shia states.
And a case in point, is the Arab Spring in the Island of Bahrain, the Island of
Bahrain is a country where you have a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni minority.
And in the early months of the Arab Spring in early 2011 it
was much the Shiite majority that rose in rebellion against the Sunni minority.
But the transformation of Bahrain into a Shiite dominated state, would
be for Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf.
The transformation of Bahrain into a state of Iranian influence, an Iranian
platform of subversion close to the coast of Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states.
Therefore the Shiization of Bahrain, was totally unacceptable and untenable for
Saudi Arabia, which invaded Bahrain and put down the Shiite rebellion there.
Just to prevent Iran from making any strategic gain in the Persian Gulf area.
And if between states, relations are governed
very much by the religious fault line.
This is all the more so within the various states of the Middle East.
The neo-traditionalists forces of Islamism, Sectarianism, and
Tribalism, can be readily identified in every
single example of the Arab Spring, and we can go through them one by one.
Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen.
Are all examples of this resurgence of
the neo-traditionalist forces of Islamism, sectarianism, or tribalism.
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