[BLANK_AUDIO]. It is against this background of the political struggle between forces that were more oriented towards tradition and others that were oriented more towards modernity. It is against this background that we should view this new phenomena, which has become known as the Arab Spring. Essentially, there are two basic paradigms that have been used in order to explain the Arab Spring. The most commonly used is the democracy - autocracy dichotomy. That the Arab Spring is all about the struggle of the forces of autocracy, against the forces of democracy. But there is another alternative paradigm that we could use, that is the struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition. And, I would argue, that it is the struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition that is a much more relevant paradigm to analyze the Arab Spring, rather than autocracy and democracy. Essentially, we can see, against the background of the Arab Spring, the emergence of neo-traditionalist political forces that come in the form of political Islam, sectarianism, and tribalism. And it is these that are far more demonstratively leading in the Arab Spring rather than the democracy, autocracy confrontation. After all, if we look at the Egyptian example, where it is the Muslim Brotherhood versus the army, neither of these are exactly the epitome of democracy. These are essentially two autocratic forces facing each other. One of them, the Muslim Brotherhood, far more represents the neo-traditionalist forces, and the army on the other hand is a much more representative organization of the forces of modernity. If we talk about the forces of neo-traditionalism, none of them is a force that is opposed to modernity or has not been deeply affected by it. Indeed political Islam is unquestionably a product of the modern world, but it is disturbed by the secularizing thrust of modernity and nationalism. They seek, in their various ways, to channel modernity and nationalism through a traditionalist mold that would allow for modernization or nationalist identity while preserving critical traditional or neo-traditional values. And not abandoning, marginalizing, or suppressing them in the name of secular nationalism or modernity. These may relate to religion and to the observance of religious law, or the preservation of sectarian and or tribal identities, with their attendant traditions, customs, and values. Looking at the social economic background of the Arab Spring, it would be advisable, to go through, the publications of the Arab human development reports that have appeared over the last decade or so. These are reports written by the United Nations, on Arab human development, and they point in recent years to three deficits, from which the Arab world tends to suffer, the deficit of political freedom. The deficit of first world education systems and the deficit in gender equality. It's the combination of these three, the lack of political freedom, the lack of first world education systems, and the lack of gender equality, which creates poorly performing economies, where you have not only low productivity because of very low female participation in the workforce. But also, high levels of population growth. This combination of poorly performing economies that have high population growths, are the background to the economic crisis that many Arab states find themselves in. And in these economic crisis you have an entire generation, those people from the age of 18 to 30, who have nothing to wait for, no expectation for a job in the near future. No expectation even for the possibility to get married in the present circumstances. No possibility to have a real life, therefore an entire younger generation completely hopeless and disenchanted with the present and the future that awaits them. It is this period in life from the age of 18 to 30, that James Gelvin has referred to, as the period of waithood. The younger generation in countries in the Middle East, go through their childhood and then their boyhood and then they came this age of 18 to 30, the age of waithood where they wait, in hopeless expectation for something to turn up to give them a life. It is this, sense of exasperation and hopelessness that is at the very root of the outburst of the Arab Spring. Much more than any particular pressure for democratization against the authoritarian regime. Spring has been used very commonly as a term to explain this phenomenon of uprisings throughout the Arab world. But Spring is a term which is, for the last part, a misnomer, the term Spring has an European connotation. It is referring in comparison to the Spring of Nations in 1848 or the, the Prague Spring of 1968, or the Spring of Nations in eastern Europe after the fall of communism. A Spring that ushered in secular democratic regimes for the most part against regimes that were very authoritarian, but this has not been the outcome in the Middle Eastern countries. And in the Middle Eastern countries for the most part, as mentioned before in this challenge between the forces of modernity and tradition or neo-tradition, it is these neo-traditional forces of Islamism and sectarian politics, or tribal politics that have come to the fore much more than democratic regimes. Why was spring used as a term to explain what was happening in the Arab world? Just as there was an emphasis on this European comparison, there was a similar emphasis in explaining the emergence of the Arab Spring on technology such as the new media, on Facebook and Twitter. This was a means of giving the revolutions in the Arab world a universalist kind of character. That is, similar to other parts of the world and among recognition of the otherness of the other. There is a tendency on the part of scholars in the West, usually ideological multi-culturists. To underrate, or even to ignore the cultural input of the other as a valid explanatory and analytical tool, and to obfuscate the importance of religion as a factor in people's behavior in the Middle East. Even though it is fairly obvious that religion is a key marker of identity in Muslim societies. In short, culture matters. That is not to say, that this is a case for Middle Eastern exceptionalism, not at all. It is just to say that culture matters in all, cultures, in all parts of the world, the Middle East included just as it matters in other regions of the world and in other cultures. And those scholars have been urged by some to be careful not to throw out the political culture baby with the bath water. Many have done so, and many still do. Why the reluctance to deal with culture? It is very much a result, of the amazing impact of Edward Said's Orientalism, and Said's rejection of the Orientalist emphasis on culture. And Said in his book Orientalism, dismissed the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous radically different inhabitants, who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space. But as others have pointed out, this results in the proclivity, to explain events as if these were generic phenomena, inextricably linked to paradigms of a universal nature. Such universal paradigms attempt to explain widely divergent historical developments, as if differences in culture, time, and place, had no vital bearing on historical outcomes. Thus, there is this politically correct tendency, to ignore the undercurrents of political culture, and to focus on the more superficial readily apparent globalized features of universalism. Such as Facebook and Twitter, instead of the more profound and less immediately recognizable political under currents of Middle Eastern societies. And we, as we have seen them in this course over the last 200 years. The focus, therefore, in those who spoke of the Arab Spring was on the secular Democrats and not the Islamists, but it was the Islamists who actually rose to the fore, very much at the expense of the secular Democrats. There were those who said that perhaps Arab Awakening, would have been a better term than Arab Spring. That's an interesting term to think of, Arab Awakening. It's not original, it's 100 years old. Arab Awakening, is the name that was given to the Arab nationalist awakening in the early years of the 20th Century. That that we discussed on the eve of the first world war, and during the fist World War. But there is a huge difference between that Arab awakening and the awakening now, if that is the term to be used. The Arab awakening of the early 20th century, was essentially secular. It was about Arab nationalism, it was about defining people in accordance with the language they spoke, Arabic, not by their religion, Muslim or otherwise. So the Arab awakening had a certain secular thrust in the early 20th century. But that is hardly the case now. When secularism, as we have seen, is very much in retreat, and there are number of reasons for this, secular retreat. [BLANK_AUDIO]. The path of secularism, in the late 19th and 20th centuries in the Middle East, was very much an emulation of the West that was at the height of its power. The height of its power and expansion, and it was the source of this power that those who secularized, sought to emulate. But the West in recent decades, is far less impressive, and in economic decline both in the United States and in Europe. It is a far less appealing example to follow these days than it was earlier in the 20th century. There was another great secular model to follow. That was very much the case in the middle of the 20th century and that was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was this great example, of a weak country which within the space of one generation turned into a super power. For the Arabs who were in this urgent quest for power, prestige, and prosperity, the Soviet Union seemed to be the ideal model to follow. But the model of the Soviet Union collapsed in the Soviet Union itself. And there is nothing much left of the Soviet model to follow. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly of all was the failure of Arabism. Arabism was often or not only a movement for the unity of the Arab people, Arabism was a secular ideology. Arabism was the platform for the secularization of Arab politics and society. After all, Arabism spoke about uniting people on the basis of the language they spoke, and not the religion to which they belonged. But the failure of Arabism also meant the failure of this platform of secularization, and the general weakening of the Arab states. Against the background of this weakening of the Arab states, we see the rise to the fore in the Middle East of the non-Arab powers. The elevation of Turkey and Iran as regional super powers. [BLANK_AUDIO]. These two countries, Turkey and Iran, much like the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire of the 19th century. Meet in the territory of present day Iraq in their respective spheres of influence. Turkey influential in northern Iraq, and Iran in pretty much the rest. These are not just the spheres of influence between these two rising powers, Turkey and Iran. They are also the spheres of influence, Between Sunni and Shia. Turkey being in the most powerful of the Sunni states, and Iran the leader of the Shiite countries and the Shiite members of the Middle Eastern countries. Iraq, like it was in the days of the Ottoman Empire, is now the border area between the Sunni and Shia. And it is interesting to note, that in the arrangement of Middle Eastern alliances these days, it is not the pro-American states against the pro-Soviet states, which is obviously very much of an anachronism, and totally irrelevant in the present. It is neither the monarchies versus the republics, but the states of the Middle East organize themselves these days in alliances on the basis of their religions affiliation, the Sunni states versus the Shia states. And a case in point, is the Arab Spring in the Island of Bahrain, the Island of Bahrain is a country where you have a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni minority. And in the early months of the Arab Spring in early 2011 it was much the Shiite majority that rose in rebellion against the Sunni minority. But the transformation of Bahrain into a Shiite dominated state, would be for Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf. The transformation of Bahrain into a state of Iranian influence, an Iranian platform of subversion close to the coast of Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states. Therefore the Shiization of Bahrain, was totally unacceptable and untenable for Saudi Arabia, which invaded Bahrain and put down the Shiite rebellion there. Just to prevent Iran from making any strategic gain in the Persian Gulf area. And if between states, relations are governed very much by the religious fault line. This is all the more so within the various states of the Middle East. The neo-traditionalists forces of Islamism, Sectarianism, and Tribalism, can be readily identified in every single example of the Arab Spring, and we can go through them one by one. Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen. Are all examples of this resurgence of the neo-traditionalist forces of Islamism, sectarianism, or tribalism.
