Explore
For Enterprise
Join for Free
Log In

Arts et humanités
Business
Informatique
Science des données
Technologies de l'information
santé
Mathématiques et logique
Développement personnel
Sciences physiques et ingénierie
Sciences sociales
Apprentissage des langues
Diplômes
Certificats

Explorez l'intégralité de Coursera

Parcourir
Rechercher
For Enterprise
Connexion
Inscrivez-vous gratuitement

9.3.1.1 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 1

Loading...

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

Université de Tel Aviv

4.8 (300 notes) | 11K étudiants inscrits

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

Visualiser le programme de cours

Avis

4.8 (300 notes)

5 stars
243 ratings
4 stars
49 ratings
3 stars
6 ratings
2 stars
1 ratings
1 star
1 ratings

DA

Jan 31, 2016

An excellent course that examines the evolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict and which provides a historical context for the "Arab Spring" Insightful and thought-provoking...

TP

May 01, 2016

An excellent follow-up and continuation to Part I. This course offers great insight into the historical and current relations of the countries within this region.

À partir de la leçon

WEEK 5

The Middle East from 1967 to the present including the Arab Spring

9.1.1 The Post-1967 Middle East: The Victory of State Interest - Part 110:02

9.1.2 The Post-1967 Middle East: The Victory of State Interest - Part 27:59

9.2 The Islamic Revival8:35

9.2.1.1 The Islamic Revival in Egypt, Syria and Iraq - Part 14:52

9.2.1.2 The Islamic Revival in Egypt, Syria and Iraq - Part 26:34

9.2.2 The Examples of Jordan, Algeria and the Palestinians8:04

9.3.1.1 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 15:22

9.3.1.2 The "Arab Spring": Modernity and Tradition - Part 211:30

9.3.2.1 The "Arab Spring": Egypt and Tunisia - Part 15:54

9.3.2.2 The "Arab Spring": Syria, Jordan, Yemen and Libya - Part 211:49

9.4.1 The Non-Arab Countries - The Republic of Turkey : From WWII to the Present11:42

9.4.2.1 The Non-Arab Countries - Iran: From the Pahlavi Dynasty to the Islamic Republic - Part 16:38

9.4.2.2 The Non-Arab Countries - Iran: From the Pahlavi Dynasty to the Islamic Republic - Part 26:45

9.5 Concluding Overview3:40

Enseigné par

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow

Transcription

[BLANK_AUDIO].

It is against this background of the political struggle between forces that

were more oriented towards tradition and

others that were oriented more towards modernity.

It is against this background that we should view this

new phenomena, which has become known as the Arab Spring.

Essentially, there are two basic paradigms that have

been used in order to explain the Arab Spring.

The most commonly used is the democracy - autocracy dichotomy.

That the Arab Spring is all about the struggle

of the forces of autocracy, against the forces of democracy.

But there is another alternative paradigm that we could use,

that is the struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition.

And, I would argue, that it is the

struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition

that is a much more relevant paradigm to

analyze the Arab Spring, rather than autocracy and democracy.

Essentially, we can see, against the background

of the Arab Spring, the emergence of

neo-traditionalist political forces that come in the

form of political Islam, sectarianism, and tribalism.

And it is these that are far more demonstratively leading in the Arab

Spring rather than the democracy, autocracy confrontation.

After all, if we look at the Egyptian example, where it is the

Muslim Brotherhood versus the army, neither of

these are exactly the epitome of democracy.

These are essentially two autocratic forces facing each other.

One of them, the Muslim Brotherhood, far

more represents the neo-traditionalist forces, and the army

on the other hand is a much

more representative organization of the forces of modernity.

If we talk about the forces of neo-traditionalism, none of them is a

force that is opposed to modernity or has not been deeply affected by it.

Indeed political Islam is unquestionably a product of the modern world,

but it is disturbed by the secularizing thrust of modernity and nationalism.

They seek, in their various ways, to

channel modernity and nationalism through a traditionalist mold

that would allow for modernization or nationalist

identity while preserving critical traditional or neo-traditional values.

And not abandoning, marginalizing, or suppressing them

in the name of secular nationalism or modernity.

These may relate to religion and to the observance of religious law, or the

preservation of sectarian and or tribal identities,

with their attendant traditions, customs, and values.

Looking at the social economic background of the

Arab Spring, it would be advisable, to go through,

the publications of the Arab human development reports

that have appeared over the last decade or so.

These are reports written by the United Nations, on Arab human development,

and they point in recent years to three deficits, from which the Arab

world tends to suffer, the deficit of political freedom.

The deficit of first world education

systems and the deficit in gender equality.

It's the combination of these three, the lack of political freedom,

the lack of first world education systems, and the lack of

gender equality, which creates poorly performing economies, where you have

not only low productivity because of very low female participation in the workforce.

But also, high levels of population growth.

This combination of poorly performing economies

that have high population growths, are

the background to the economic crisis that many Arab states find themselves in.

And in these economic crisis you have an

entire generation, those people from the age of 18

to 30, who have nothing to wait for, no expectation for a job in the near future.

No expectation even for the possibility to get married in the present circumstances.

No possibility to have a real life, therefore an entire younger generation

completely hopeless and disenchanted with the

present and the future that awaits them.

It is this period in life from the age of 18 to

30, that James Gelvin has referred to, as the period of waithood.

The younger generation in countries in the Middle East, go through

their childhood and then their boyhood and then they came this age

of 18 to 30, the age of waithood where they wait, in

hopeless expectation for something to turn up to give them a life.

It is this, sense of exasperation and hopelessness that is

at the very root of the outburst of the Arab Spring.

Much more than any particular pressure

for democratization against the authoritarian regime.

Spring has been used very commonly as a term

to explain this phenomenon of uprisings throughout the Arab world.

But Spring is a term which is, for the last

part, a misnomer, the term Spring has an European connotation.

It is referring in comparison to the Spring

of Nations in 1848 or the, the Prague

Spring of 1968, or the Spring of Nations

in eastern Europe after the fall of communism.

A Spring that ushered in secular democratic

regimes for the most part against regimes that

were very authoritarian, but this has not

been the outcome in the Middle Eastern countries.

And in the Middle Eastern countries for the most part, as mentioned

before in this challenge between the forces of modernity and tradition or

neo-tradition, it is these neo-traditional forces of Islamism and sectarian politics,

or tribal politics that have come to the fore much more than democratic regimes.

Why was spring used as a term to explain what was happening in the Arab world?

Just as there was an emphasis on this European

comparison, there was a similar emphasis in explaining the emergence of the

Arab Spring on technology such as the new media, on Facebook and Twitter.

This was a means of giving the revolutions

in the Arab world a universalist kind of character.

That is, similar to other parts of the world

and among recognition of the otherness of the other.

There is a tendency on the part

of scholars in the West, usually ideological multi-culturists.

To underrate, or even to ignore the cultural input

of the other as a valid explanatory and analytical

tool, and to obfuscate the importance of religion as

a factor in people's behavior in the Middle East.

Even though it is fairly obvious that religion

is a key marker of identity in Muslim societies.

In short, culture matters.

That is not to say, that this is

a case for Middle Eastern exceptionalism, not at all.

It is just to say that culture matters in all, cultures, in all parts of the world,

the Middle East included just as it matters in

other regions of the world and in other cultures.

And those scholars have been urged by some to be careful

not to throw out the political culture baby with the bath water.

Many have done so, and many still do.

Why the reluctance to deal with culture?

It is very much a result, of the amazing impact

of Edward Said's Orientalism, and Said's

rejection of the Orientalist emphasis on culture.

And Said in his book Orientalism, dismissed the notion

that there are geographical spaces

with indigenous radically different inhabitants,

who can be defined on the basis of some

religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space.

But as others have pointed out, this

results in the proclivity, to explain events

as if these were generic phenomena, inextricably

linked to paradigms of a universal nature.

Such universal paradigms attempt to explain

widely divergent historical developments, as if

differences in culture, time, and place,

had no vital bearing on historical outcomes.

Thus, there is this politically correct

tendency, to ignore the undercurrents of political

culture, and to focus on the more

superficial readily apparent globalized features of universalism.

Such as Facebook and Twitter, instead of the more profound

and less immediately recognizable political

under currents of Middle Eastern societies.

And we, as we have seen them in this course over the last 200 years.

The focus, therefore, in those who spoke of the Arab

Spring was on the secular Democrats and not the Islamists,

but it was the Islamists who actually rose to the

fore, very much at the expense of the secular Democrats.

There were those who said that perhaps Arab Awakening,

would have been a better term than Arab Spring.

That's an interesting term to think of, Arab Awakening.

It's not original, it's 100 years old.

Arab Awakening, is the name that was given to the

Arab nationalist awakening in the early years of the 20th Century.

That that we discussed on the eve of the

first world war, and during the fist World War.

But there is a huge difference between that Arab awakening and

the awakening now, if that is the term to be used.

The Arab awakening of the early 20th century, was essentially secular.

It was about Arab nationalism, it was about defining people in accordance with

the language they spoke, Arabic, not by their religion, Muslim or otherwise.

So the Arab awakening had a certain secular thrust in the early 20th century.

But that is hardly the case now.

When secularism, as we have seen, is very much in

retreat, and there are number of reasons for this, secular retreat.

[BLANK_AUDIO].

The path of secularism, in the late 19th and 20th centuries in the Middle East,

was very much an emulation of the West that was at the height of its power.

The height of its power and expansion, and it was the

source of this power that those who secularized, sought to emulate.

But the West in recent decades, is far less impressive, and

in economic decline both in the United States and in Europe.

It is a far less appealing example to follow

these days than it was earlier in the 20th century.

There was another great secular model to follow.

That was very much the case in the middle

of the 20th century and that was the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was this great example, of a weak country

which within the space of one generation turned into a super power.

For the Arabs who were in this urgent quest for power, prestige,

and prosperity, the Soviet Union seemed to be the ideal model to follow.

But the model of the Soviet Union collapsed in the Soviet Union itself.

And there is nothing much left of the Soviet model to follow.

Thirdly and perhaps most importantly of all was the failure of Arabism.

Arabism was often or not only a movement for the

unity of the Arab people, Arabism was a secular ideology.

Arabism was the platform for the

secularization of Arab politics and society.

After all, Arabism spoke about uniting people on the basis of

the language they spoke, and not the religion to which they belonged.

But the failure of Arabism also meant the failure of this

platform of secularization, and the general weakening of the Arab states.

Against the background of this weakening of the Arab states, we see

the rise to the fore in the Middle East of the non-Arab powers.

The elevation of Turkey and Iran as regional super powers.

[BLANK_AUDIO].

These two countries, Turkey and Iran, much like the

Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire of the 19th century.

Meet in the territory of present day Iraq in their respective spheres of influence.

Turkey influential in northern Iraq, and Iran in pretty much the rest.

These are not just the spheres of influence

between these two rising powers, Turkey and Iran.

They are also the spheres of influence, Between Sunni and Shia.

Turkey being in the most powerful of the Sunni states, and Iran the leader of the

Shiite countries and the Shiite members of the Middle Eastern countries.

Iraq, like it was in the days of the Ottoman

Empire, is now the border area between the Sunni and Shia.

And it is interesting to note, that in the arrangement

of Middle Eastern alliances these days, it is not the

pro-American states against the pro-Soviet states, which is obviously very

much of an anachronism, and totally irrelevant in the present.

It is neither the monarchies versus the republics,

but the states of the Middle East organize themselves these days in alliances on the

basis of their religions affiliation, the Sunni states versus the Shia states.

And a case in point, is the Arab Spring in the Island of Bahrain, the Island of

Bahrain is a country where you have a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni minority.

And in the early months of the Arab Spring in early 2011 it

was much the Shiite majority that rose in rebellion against the Sunni minority.

But the transformation of Bahrain into a Shiite dominated state, would

be for Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf.

The transformation of Bahrain into a state of Iranian influence, an Iranian

platform of subversion close to the coast of Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states.

Therefore the Shiization of Bahrain, was totally unacceptable and untenable for

Saudi Arabia, which invaded Bahrain and put down the Shiite rebellion there.

Just to prevent Iran from making any strategic gain in the Persian Gulf area.

And if between states, relations are governed

very much by the religious fault line.

This is all the more so within the various states of the Middle East.

The neo-traditionalists forces of Islamism, Sectarianism, and

Tribalism, can be readily identified in every

single example of the Arab Spring, and we can go through them one by one.

Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen.

Are all examples of this resurgence of

the neo-traditionalist forces of Islamism, sectarianism, or tribalism.

Explorer notre catalogue

Rejoignez-nous gratuitement et obtenez des recommendations, des mises à jour et des offres personnalisées.

Coursera propose un accès universel à la meilleure formation au monde, en partenariat avec des universités et des organisations du plus haut niveau, pour proposer des cours en ligne.

© 2019 Coursera Inc. Tous droits réservés.

Télécharger dans l'App Store

Disponible sur Google Play

Coursera
À propos
Direction
Carrières
Catalogue
Certificats
Certificats MasterTrack™
Diplômes
For Enterprise
For Government

Communauté
Learners
Partners
Developers
Beta Testers
Translators

Se connecter
Blog
Facebook
LinkedIn
Twitter
Instagram
YouTube
Blog Tech

Plus
Conditions
Confidentialité
Aide
Accessibilité
Presse
Contact
Répertoire
Filiales