When John F. Kennedy entered the presidential limousine at Love Field in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, he began his ride into history. That journey continues even today and we call it the Kennedy legacy. This course will explore the Presidency, assassination, and lasting legacy of President John F. Kennedy. Students will learn how JFK’s life, administration, and tragic death have influenced the general public, the media, and each of the nine U.S. presidents who followed. Understanding the Kennedy legacy and being able to identify elements of his legacy within the context of modern politics helps understand many of the vexing problems that developed over the last half century as well as many of the challenges that confront us today. November 22, 1963 was so powerful a moment that in the fifty years since the assassination, every U.S. President that followed JFK has used Kennedy’s words and actions in an effort to craft their own political image. Why does Kennedy’s influence persist, and will it continue? What are the effects? We’ll address these questions and more as we explore The Kennedy Half Century. Follow on Twitter: @JFKclass.
The Berlin Crisis
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En provenance du cours de University of Virginia
The Kennedy Half Century
268 notes
À partir de la leçon
The Kennedy Presidency and Assassination
Rencontrer les enseignants
Professor Larry J. SabatoRobert Kent Gooch Professor of Politics
Director, UVA Center for Politics
[MUSIC]
>> On May 31st,1961, Air Force One touched down in Paris.
Kennedy was there to reassure President Charles
de Gaulle of his commitment to France's
security The President and Mrs. Kennedy were
received by the French people as celebrities.
Kennedy enjoyed the adulation but knew that he would
soon be dealing with a much tougher audience in Vienna.
Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had agreed
to meet Kennedy for the first time on June third, 1961.
The Bay of Pigs fiasco had made JFK look weak,
and Khrushchev would try to test him, especially on Berlin.
The question was whether the Soviet Union was willing to risk a war over the city.
Kennedy wasn't so sure.
Berlin was the Cold War's preeminent hot spot.
And a major embarrassment for the Soviets.
At the end of World War II, the allies had divided the city as well as
the whole of Germany into four occupation zones
controlled by American, French, British and Russian forces.
Unfortunately, for NATO, Berlin lay 110 miles inside communist East Germany.
Making it difficult to defend.
In 1948 the Soviets had closed off the highways, railroads,
and waterways, leading into the city with the hope of seizing control.
President Harry Truman responded by airlifting 2 million tons of
supplies to west Berlin and putting troops and bombers on standby.
This show of force convinced the Soviets to back down, but they had
never abandoned the dream of seeing
the city united under a communist dictatorship.
The East German people grew to
loathe the Soviet system.
By 1961, thousands of them were pouring across the border
each month in search of jobs and freedom in the west.
Khrushchev was under pressure to stop the
exodus before the communist government there collapsed outright.
He thought the best way might be to sign a peace treaty with East
Germany which, in turn, as a supposedly
independent state, could then expel the western allies
from Berlin and absorb the city. Such an agreement would also keep
Germany from reuniting, which was a primary goal for Russia, having lost
more than 20 million people to German aggression during World War II.
On June 3rd, 1961, Kennedy shook hands with Khrushchev
on the steps of the American embassy in Vienna.
Behind closed doors, however, things quickly
turned ugly.
When Kennedy suggested that the two
leaders work together to maintain the geopolitical
status quo, Khrushchev lectured the young
president on the inevitable triumph of communism.
When Kennedy warned about the dangers of
miscalculation and war, Khrushchev told a story
about a man who kept trying to control his son after he'd already grown up.
One day the son simply refused to
take any more instructions from the aging father.
The parallels were obvious.
Khrushchev threw verbal punches the rest of the afternoon.
He got JFK to admit that the Cuban operation had been a quote, mistake, and
pointed out the hypocrisy of opposing Castro while
supporting right-wing dictators like Francisco Franco in Spain.
The sole bright spot
in the afternoon came when Khrushchev agreed
to support a neutral government in Laos.
Kennedy's military mobilization had convinced Khrushchev that
the United States was planning to invade Laos.
And so in the Soviet's mind, neutrality was a better alternative.
The truth was it was a bluff, Kennedy had not wanted to militarily invade Laos.
But the bluff worked.
In another part of Vienna, Kennedy's advisers were reviewing the
minutes of the day's Kennedy Khrushchev sessions and wringing their hands.
President Kennedy had been soundly thrashed, with some of his own
advisers thinking that the President had come across as a tongue-tied rookie.
They likened the entire event to a meaningless dance routine.
The Soviets were even more unimpressed
with President Kennedy.
The sparring match between the leaders of the
East and the West continued the next day.
Talk between Kennedy and Khrushchev turned to
Berlin, and the Soviet Chairman grew visibly agitated.
Describing the west part of the city as quote the bone in the Soviet throat.
Kennedy had none of it and insisted that the
United States will defend West Berlin at all cost.
Khrushchev bellowed quote, if the US wants to start
a war over Germany let it be so unquote.
The Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with East Germany by
the end of the year starting the process of West Berlin's absorption.
And it was up to the United States to decide whether that meant war.
Kennedy didn't flinch. Quote, then, Mister Chairman, there will
be war. It will be a cold winter, unquote.
The Berlin crisis had begun.
It was one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War.
A single misstep on either side could have plunged the Earth into nuclear winter.
And this thought weighed heavily on President Kennedy's mind.
Back home on June sixth, 1961, the
President appeared on television and briefed the American
people on his trip to Vienna.
[MUSIC]
>> Mister Khrushchev and I had a very full and frank exchange
of views on the major issues that now divide our two countries.
I will tell you now, that it was a very sober two days.
There was no discourtesy.
[MUSIC]
>> No loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side.
No advantage or concession was either gained or given.
>> Kennedy was less than fully truthful, of course.
Khrushchev's announcement that he would sign a treaty
with East Germany by December was a crystal-clear ultimatum.
But the President didn't want to trigger panic.
The Vienna talks had been useful, he
said.
And the somber mood they conveyed was not cause for elation
or relaxation, nor was it cause for undue pessimism or fear.
Instead said President Kennedy, they had quote, simply demonstrated how
much work we in the free world have to do.
And how long and hard a struggle must be our fate as Americans
in this generation, as the chief defenders of the cause of liberty, unquote.
Behind the scenes, though, airy discussions about liberty took
a back seat to preparations for a Berlin crisis.
Bobby Kennedy thought there was a
one-in-five chance of war during this period.
It was time for the American eagle to show its talons.
And the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.
Most American policymakers reasoned that the Soviets would back down in the face
of American military superiority.
Kennedy still lacked a clear strategic policy on Berlin.
And time was running out.
He needed to devise a way to unite the American people, and send
the Soviets a firm message about
the West's determination to defend democratic Germany.
But at the same time, he needed to provide Khrushchev with an escape hatch.
Kennedy scheduled a nationally-televised
address to the nation on July 25th.
Even as his advisers strongly disagreed about the right approach.
By the time of his speech, Kennedy had
settled on a somewhat bellicose approach to Berlin.
Quote, seven weeks ago tonight, I return.
>> I returned from Europe to report on
my meeting with Premier Khrushchev and the others.
His grim warnings
about the future of the world. His aide memoir in Berlin.
The subsequent speeches and threats, which he and
his agents have launched. And the increase in the Soviet military
budget that he has announced. Have all prompted a series of decisions
by the administration, and a series of consultations
with the members of the NATO organization. The immediate threat to free men is in
West Berlin, but that isolated outpost is not an
isolated problem. The threat is worldwide, our efforts must
be equally wide and strong and not be obsessed by any
single manufactured crisis. We face a challenge in
Berlin but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where
the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and
the dangers of Communism less apparent to those who have so little.
We face a challenge in our own hemisphere, and indeed,
wherever else the freedom of human beings is at stake.
The world is not deceived by the Communist
attempt to label Berlin as a hotbed of war.
There is peace in Berlin today.
The source of world trouble and tension is Moscow, not Berlin.
And if war begins, it will have begun in Moscow.
And not Berlin.
For the choice of peace or war is largely theirs, not ours.
>> In
the short term, President Kennedy would
need an extra $3.2 billion, additional soldiers,
additional sailors and airmen, that would require a massive expansion of the draft.
President Kennedy also asked for the authority to activate the reserves.
He asked for more non-nuclear weapons, ammunition and equipment.
Kennedy's call for public sacrifice echoed the themes he'd outlined
in his inagural address, when he said, we shall pay any price, bear
any burden, meet any hardship, to ensure the survival and the success of liberty.
Jobs and educations would be interrupted, said the President.
Quote, husbands and sons will be called away.
Incomes, in some cases, will be reduced.
But these are burdens which must be borne if freedom is to be defended.
Americans have willingly borne them before.
And they will not flinch from the tasks now.
By and large, the press interpreted the speech
as hard-line, and they downplayed the President's peace overtures.
As expected, the public rallied around their Commander in Chief, while
lawmakers approved the funding for
virtually all of Kennedy's specific requests.
JFK still hoped to avoid a fight.
What he had intentionally left out of the speech
was really as important as what he'd included in it.
In early August 1961 East German communist leader Walter
Ulbricht, proposed closing the border between East and West Berlin.
A plan known as Operation Chinese Wall.
That had been tossed around in Communist circles for several years.
Kruschev approved the scheme and in the early hours
of August 13th, East German troops began building the
infamous 103 mile long Berlin Wall, running through the
center of Berlin and dividing the eastern and western sectors.
In order to close the gap and create a bargaining chip
for Berlin, Khrushchev deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba the following year.
The end of one
crisis thus planted the seeds for the next, a far worse
crisis that would bring the world literally to the brink of Armageddon.
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