Welcome back. We've looked at India's foreign policy all through these phases from 1947 till 2011. And we've come to know the more contemporary or more recent phase of Indian foreign policy. It's really much mitigated continuity than any break, and any disjunction. Clearly India's foreign policy is driven by a strong commitment to economic growth by a special relationship with the United States. As well, as insuring that militarily it can remain secure, and to be able to settle an unfriendly neighbourhood. But along the way there are new ideas, new churnings, new thinking. For instance, what perhaps the most important development from 2011 to 2014 was a report written by Influential Indian Thinkers backed they say by a section of the political leadership of the country the book was called <i>Nonalignment 2.0.</i> The book report suggested that India's foreign policy should again go back in some ways to the original idea of not getting entrapped in a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. And stay away, and judge every shameless merit. This report of course was critiqued heavily particularly by those who believed it was a whole idea on nonalignment in the 21st century was fanciful. That it was going back rather than looking ahead. And yet, there was a point which goes to the core of the Indian thinking, which has always emphasised strategic autonomy, that the space, the freedom to be able to take independent decisions and make even unpopular choices without being fettered by an alliance or being fettered by a special relationship. The other feature of India's foreign policy during this period became evident was a lack of capacity. And I keep calling it capacity, capacity, capacity is India's biggest weakness in terms of its diplomacy. If you are a rising power, you need to have the resources to be able to manage your foreign policy. Today, India is serviced by only about India's foreign policies serviced by about 600 diplomats who man more than 150 missions internationally as well as headquarters at home. Clearly, you need a massive expansion of India's foreign policy practitioners. And you need also transformation of the ministry of external affairs which is function in isolation, which has seen foreign policy as a curve, and does not even have secondments from the ministry of commerce and other economic ministries. Clearly economics and trade are a vital part of India's foreign policy. Therefore, there needs to be that expansion of capacity and restructuring of the Indian foreign policy establishment. But 2014 and beyond is really a work in progress. And it is closely associated with perhaps India's strongest Prime Minister since Indira Gandhi, Narendra Modi. Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India in May 2014, on the basis of the first time that the BJP has a security, a majority on its own. He comes with a three, a track record of being chief minister of Gujarat for three times, and having transformed the Gujarat into a successful model of economic enterprise, good governance, and has created an investor friendly environment. Clearly he sees trade and foreign policy as intrinsically linked, and that the trade part perhaps even having greater leverage. When the President of India to the new Parliament, spoke about the agenda of the government, it is a really a document that the president merely is, which is provided to the President by the government of the day, and articulates the policies of the government. When he spoke at the opening of the Parliament there was an interesting, battles on India's foreign policy. What I might call Modi's foreign policy. And these had five different elements. One, the whole idea of enlightened national interest. Which is described as national interest plus recognising that there can be situation in which the narrow pursuit of your self interest may lead to sub optimal outcomes, therefore an enlightened national interest is a belief that you can cooperate, collaborate, especially on global problems, working multilaterally. The second is the whole idea of using economic and trade as a way of binding South Asia. Modi clearly believes that the conflicts in South Asia with Pakistan, with even Bangladesh and Nepal, can be resolved if you have an integrated neighbourhood driven by economics and trade. He believes that the relationship with China has improved primarily because you were able to put the conflict on the back burner, and improve engagement in the economic, cultural, and other fronts. The third emphasis is on India's soft power. Modi described this as using the various T’s tourism, tradition, talent, trade as advancing India's foreign policy. And instead of nonalignment or alignment equally alignment with all powers. Building relation with China, building relation with Japan, continuing the great relationship with the Soviet, with Russia. Strengthening the relationship with the United States and building bonds with the EU. Not make choices until there are such serious mannequin situations where you're forced to make a choice. And finally also willingness to enter into a dialogue and reconciliation with Pakistan. These are the five initial incipient pages on Modi's foreign policy. But ultimately as I say, India's foreign policy through Nehru to Modi to Indira Gandhi, watched by Edmund Munshi has relied primarily on the three S's. Space or strategic autonomy, the space and the freedom for India to make unpopular choices if needed in an archaic international environment. A search for stability within and in an unfriendly neighbourhood and the strength-economic, military, soft power to protect and advance Indian interests. To conclude, India's foreign policy has moved from the idea of power to the reality of power, to new phases, but ultimately it's been guided by the search for space, stability, and strength. Thank you very much.
