Welcome back. We talked about earlier, about how India's first foreign policy phase was embedded in an idealistic tradition rooted in the Freedom Movement. And how towards the end, however, you could see on three critical issues, on Kashmir, on the relation with Pakistan, and functioning of the UN Security Council, India's fate in the world of ideas had begun diminishing. However, all this changed in the next phase from 1962 to 1970, which I describe as the fractured years. These are years in which Nehru idealism came crumbling down because of the conflict with China, and Nehru passed away in 1964. And thereafter, there was a shaky, not really strong leadership which continued till about 1970, but began to recognize that the world does not seem to function on the basis of ideas and idealism. It's a much more Machiavellian, realist world, and you perhaps need to engage with it much more practically and realistically. Sino Indian Conflict is a conflict which had history, and the region, its history written about. But clearly when you need to contextualize the whole conflict from a Nehruvian prison, Nehru believed that China and India, both civilizational states, freshly independent. Or freshly taking the world stage after 150, 200 years of Western humiliation and misrule and colonization, would be partners and friends and allies, he genuinely believed this. India continued to remain a sponsor for the People's Republic of China to take its seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Even though early on, till the 70s, till the detente between the United States and China, it was Taiwan that was occupying that seat. It was Nehru who introduced Zhou Enlai to other world leaders in Bandung. It was Nehru who wrote extensively about China and how China was a country with which India will be able to do business, will be able to contribute to peacemaking in the world. Even after the Dali Llama fled China and took refuge in India and the Chinese all but annexed Tibet, India continue to accept and agree to accept not just the suzerainty of China or Tibet, but even its sovereignty. And yet, in 1959 there was a border dispute over how the border had been demarcated in the east and the north. In the east, it was the McMahon Line, which the Chinese refused to recognize, they thought this was an imperial boundary. And then there was an Aksai Chin part of Ladakh, which again, the Chinese disputed, too. Nehru, under pressure in Parliament, told the Indian Army, ill-equipped as it was, to aggressively patrol in those areas. That finally contributed to the Chinese attacking India and humiliating the Indian Army in what was the worst-ever defeat of the Indian Army since independence. And remains the only real defeat of the Indian Army in 67 years since independence. But more than just humiliate the Indian Army, more than just deeply betray Nehruvian idealism, this war was a war which changed India's perceptions of the world. Because it recognized that there were no permanent friends and allies, there were only permanent interests. It was also a war which led to a fast-pacing of India's nuclear program. It was a war which many people believe led finally to Nehru's own death. Because he was so broken to see his hope of Sino Indian unity, his hope that ideas will shape the world come crumbling down. But it was a war which brought home to India the need to rapidly develop its military prowess, in addition to developing other institutions as well. 1965, after Nehru's death, you had a little-known steely, but not really articulate Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who's most associated with the slogan Jai Jawan Jai Kisan, which means hail the farmer, hail the soldier. But who was there as prime minister of India during the war with Pakistan. And that was a war in which there was a stalemate, India could have lost that war hadn't it been for the ceasefire that was brokered. But that was, again, the only war in which Pakistan may have had India on the defensive. It was a war in which Pakistan actually believed that India, humiliated out of the Sino Indian Conflict, was so weak that they would have the upper ground. It was started by first infiltrating Pakistani Intelligence agents into Kashmir. When that plan was exposed, there was a war. And finally, however, there was a stalemate, a ceasefire, and peace negotiated by the Soviet Union in Tashkent, between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and General Ayub Khan. A day after signing that peace deal or that ceasefire agreement in Tashkent, Shastri died by a heart attack, although some people think that there might have been some mysterious circumstances that led to his death. India during these years, as I said, after Nehru passing away, had able but weak leadership of Shastri. And after Shastri's death, you had Nehru's own daughter, Indira Gandhi, become Prime Minister, but still under circumstances whereas she was not completely under control. Simultaneously, India faced sanctions from America, food sanctions, which because of India's stand on the Vietnam War. India had opposed American intervention in Vietnam. The regime of Lyndon Johnson sanctioned India into what became known as a ship-to-mouth policy, giving India food aid only as much as to feed its population on almost a daily basis. But these fractured years, these years when India was weak, when it was humiliated by the Chinese, when India and Pakistan went to war again in probably the worst war for India. When Nehru's death had led to a weak leadership, also led to deep introspection. If it hadn't been for the US sanctions, India's Green Revolution wouldn't have taken place. If it hadn't been for the Sino Indian Conflict, India's military modernization wouldn't have taken place. If it hadn't been for the India-Pak war of 1965, India's own strategic thinking may not have overcome the kind of limited tactics that were employed in the 65 war. So these fractured years led to a new, promising beginning.
