Introduction to Human Rights Week 2: The internationalization of Human Rights II. Human Rights and international law Today, international law specialists recognize that Human Rights are protected by the international legal order. And yet, in 1945, this idea seemed still utopian and revolutionary. Thus, the internationalization of Human Rights involved an important evolution of the international legal order. Indeed, Human Rights questioned the foundations and the characteristics of international law as it existed in the first half of the 20th century. Let us focus for a moment on the foundations and the characteristics of classic international law. The principles that we are going to discover together remain relevant today. However, their scope has been relativized in order to accommodate the international protection of Human Rights. The classic model of international law is also often called the Westphalian model. This model's primary aim is to insure the coexistence between States. It is a system which is centered on States. States are simultaneously the authors and the addressees of the rules of international law. Indeed, States govern the relations between each other thanks to contractual instruments: international treaties. States are simultaneously the authors and the addressees of these treaties. They are free to conclude international treaties according to their national interests. Thus, treaties have their source in the sovereign will of States. However, if a State concludes a treaty by declaring its will to be bound by it, then the State has to respect it. The treaty is like a contract conferred into by an individual and has to be respected with respect to his/her contractual partner. As author and addressee of the rules of international law, the State is the only subject of the international legal order. This is still according to the classic thinking. Unlike under national law and the domestic law of States, the individual is not a subject of the international legal order. As a result, classic international law can neither impose obligations on the private persons nor confer them Rights such as Human Rights. Consequently, there is a fundamental obstacle to the emergence of Human Rights at the international stage. Centered on the State, the international legal order has another fundamental principle: that of sovereignty. The sovereignty of the State has two ensuing principles. On the one hand, there is the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States. On the other hand, there is the respect of the reserved domain of States. The question of how a State treats its nationals on its territory is crucial. Indeed, this question is central to Human Rights. According to the classic thinking, this question comes under the reserved domain of States. Therefore, the internationalization of Human Rights goes against the dogma of State sovereignty. Reciprocity is another important principle of classic international law. International law is conceived as a legal order which governs reciprocal relations between States. States always sign treaties according to their national interests. There is therefore a network of commitments between States. This point can be illustrated with a treaty on international trade. Let us take a treaty which aims to liberalize trade between two States. Let us call them "State A" and "State B". State A has a very successful textile industry. State A wants to gain access to State B's market. For its part, State B has an economy which strongly depends on viticulture and on wine products. State B therefore also has an interest to access State A's market. There is a mutual interest to collaborate. This is why the two States sign an international treaty which aims to liberalize the trades. They abolish customs duties for textile and wine products. Now, what happens if one of the States does not respect the treaty? Let us take the scenario in which State A reintroduces customs duties for wine products. What is the other State going to do? State B can take retaliatory measures and reintroduce customs duties. The export industry of State A will most likely complain to its government. There will be a incitement for State A's government to conform again to the trade treaty. Retaliatory measures can therefore be an effective tool for States to conform to this treaty governed by the logic of reciprocity. Does this logic also apply to the field of Human Rights? This is not the case. We will see why later. First of all, a State has generally no direct interest or no material interest for another state to respect Human Rights of their own citizens on its territory. In other words, to take our example again: If State A offers to respect Human Rights of its own citizens, it will not be an interesting concession for State B to commit to respecting its own citizen's Human Rights on its territory. Therefore, there is generally little incitement to sign an international treaty which commits States to respect Human Rights. If such a treaty was nevertheless signed, there would be a problem regarding the implementation. What would happen if State A decided to violate its citizens' Human Rights? Is State B going to react? And, if yes, could we expect for State B to suspend its contractual commitments and start violating Human Rights of its own citizens? We can quite easily see that this would go against the treaty's aim which is to protect the human person. It would also be an ineffective retaliatory measure. This measure would not incite State A to respect again its own citizens' Human Rights. Treaties regarding Human Rights are therefore not governed by the principle of reciprocity. This point is highlighted by the Human Rights supervisory bodies. Regarding Human Rights treaties, The United Nations Human Rights Committee has for example noticed: "such treaties [...] are not a web of inter-state exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individual with rights. The principle of reciprocity between States does not apply." Since the instruments which aim to protect Human Rights do not follow the logic of reciprocity, a different implementation machinery will also be needed. Indeed, the respect for these obligations and for these treaties cannot be left to States on their own. Ideally, an international supervisory body should be provided for and it should confer the capacity to the human person to complain to this international body. It is indeed the private person, and not the State, who has an interest in seeing Human Rights respected. However, this solution goes against the principle that we have already mentioned. It goes against the principle of sovereignty of States. Moreover, there is a departure from the vision that it is the State, and not the private person, which is the only subject of international law. In light of these elements, you can understand why the internationalization of Human Rights was a revolutionary project. It has required a profound change of international law. International law had to change from a legal order centered on States, to a legal order which takes the interests of the private persons into account and which protects these interests. Insofar as the international treaties regarding Human Rights confer rights to the people, the human person has become a subject of international law. This is also radical. The profound change of the International legal order that I have mentioned did not happen miraculously or suddenly after World War II. Several precursors prepared the ground. They made the emergence of Human Rights at the international stage easier.