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Retour à Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées

Avis et commentaires pour d'étudiants pour Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées par Université de Stanford

4.7
étoiles
567 évaluations

À propos du cours

Popularized by movies such as "A Beautiful Mind", game theory is the mathematical modeling of strategic interaction among rational (and irrational) agents. Over four weeks of lectures, this advanced course considers how to design interactions between agents in order to achieve good social outcomes. Three main topics are covered: social choice theory (i.e., collective decision making and voting systems), mechanism design, and auctions. In the first week we consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making. We present some of the most important theoretical results in the area: notably, Arrow's Theorem, which proves that there is no "perfect" voting system, and also the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite Theorems. We move on to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences. We explain "mechanism design" -- a broad framework for designing interactions between self-interested agents -- and give some key theoretical results. Our third week focuses on the problem of designing mechanisms to maximize aggregate happiness across agents, and presents the powerful family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The course wraps up with a fourth week that considers the problem of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents, and that provides an introduction to auction theory. You can find a full syllabus and description of the course here: http://web.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/GTOC-II-Syllabus.html There is also a predecessor course to this one, for those who want to learn or remind themselves of the basic concepts of game theory: https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-1 An intro video can be found here: http://web.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/Game-Theory-2-Intro.mp4...

Meilleurs avis

AV

16 juil. 2020

This was a wonderful and very mathematically intensive course, but completing all the quizzes gave a great sense of accomplishment and developed my understanding of game theory and its various facets.

LV

1 mai 2017

Very interesting! One missing thing: please write explanations for correct/incorrect questions in quizzes. In the basic course, I found them very helpful in understanding why my reasoning was wrong.

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101 - 112 sur 112 Avis pour Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées

par Javier F G

14 mars 2021

The quizzes are not well designed.

par carlo p

2 sept. 2019

Excellent skills obtained

par Mufizul I

28 janv. 2017

Very nice

par Fred V

6 sept. 2020

Auction theory is left to the last lecture, and the influence of voting systems on political mechanisms is barely addressed. 3 different people lecturing, with different communication skills and flaws (hesitations, over-notating, abuse of acronyms), make following the course more difficult than it needs to be. These being said, it is clear that the authors more than know their stuff (at least the theoretical part; we would like to see them perform when bargaining in a souk) and bring a lot into the course.

par Cigdem K

15 oct. 2016

The exams did not explain why the wrong answers are wrong. Even after you succeed a test, I expect an explanation of the questions, and the correct answers. Even if I have a correct answer to a question, I don't know if my reasoning is correct..

par Telmo J P P

18 oct. 2017

Interesting, but not as good as part I. Some parts of the syllabus were not explained well enough: a lot of results just come out of thin air, and not a lot of intuitions are given.

par Emil

1 déc. 2020

Diverse course, which covered various topics. For the election processes however one could some illegal practices, which also could lead to a win. A democratic win...

par Martín B

18 sept. 2019

Should have much more real examples. Voting schemes was right, but mechanism design was completely abstract

par Carlos F S T

15 nov. 2017

No es tan bueno como el primero. Sin embargo, tomarlo como continuación es interesante.

par Jeppe v P

8 juin 2017

Interesting material, but sometimes hard to follow the lectures.

par Bernd K

26 juin 2022

I'm a little disappointed. I expected more from the course. game theoretic applications are very diverse. Here I miss the economic application of the oligopoly theory. More economic applications will likely require another course. The level of difficulty is not as high as in the game theory course.

par Mohammad Z

9 sept. 2018

poorly explained lectures. you're better off reading a textbook