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Retour à Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées

Avis et commentaires pour d'étudiants pour Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées par Université de Stanford

529 évaluations
107 avis

À propos du cours

Popularized by movies such as "A Beautiful Mind", game theory is the mathematical modeling of strategic interaction among rational (and irrational) agents. Over four weeks of lectures, this advanced course considers how to design interactions between agents in order to achieve good social outcomes. Three main topics are covered: social choice theory (i.e., collective decision making and voting systems), mechanism design, and auctions. In the first week we consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making. We present some of the most important theoretical results in the area: notably, Arrow's Theorem, which proves that there is no "perfect" voting system, and also the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite Theorems. We move on to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences. We explain "mechanism design" -- a broad framework for designing interactions between self-interested agents -- and give some key theoretical results. Our third week focuses on the problem of designing mechanisms to maximize aggregate happiness across agents, and presents the powerful family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The course wraps up with a fourth week that considers the problem of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents, and that provides an introduction to auction theory. You can find a full syllabus and description of the course here: There is also a predecessor course to this one, for those who want to learn or remind themselves of the basic concepts of game theory: An intro video can be found here:

Meilleurs avis

16 juil. 2020

This was a wonderful and very mathematically intensive course, but completing all the quizzes gave a great sense of accomplishment and developed my understanding of game theory and its various facets.

1 mai 2017

Very interesting! One missing thing: please write explanations for correct/incorrect questions in quizzes. In the basic course, I found them very helpful in understanding why my reasoning was wrong.

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76 - 100 sur 107 Avis pour Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées

par Noé D C A

19 août 2020


par Jin-wook L

1 janv. 2017


par L H

7 mai 2020

This is an absolutely fascinating course! I wish the instructors could have gone into more depth about each of the topics and also provided explanations to the problem sets like the case in the first course - the explanations helped a lot with my understanding. Nevertheless, a great introduction to the advanced applications of game theory and I look forward to a third installment!

par ZHU S

10 janv. 2019

The lecture are useful and the lecturer clear in their content and delivery. However, it would be better if more practices with answers can be given, and the tutorial should include questions of greater difficulty, such as those with real game settings and rules to solve for optimum strategy.

par Mikel N

4 mai 2020

Not only it's a very interesting course, but also is offered free with graded quizes included. I wish it had been a little more extended, because subject is complex enough to expand it at least two or three more weeks.

par george v

18 févr. 2017

Great course. Nice retracing of some notions of the course Game Theory like Pareto Oprimality. Nice idea doing some examples on auctions and voting systems. Nice proofs

par Ajay K V

4 juin 2020

Great course. Very relevant to a lot of problems in business. Content was overtly mathematical. More practical examples cold have been interesting to solve.

par Matthew W

5 nov. 2017

A lot of the important results were covered but sometimes results came out of nowhere (for example with optimal auctions and virtual valuations).

par R.Athindran

23 févr. 2017

Overall, the course was good. Somehow, the concepts were not as clear as the basic game theory course. Definitely more advanced.

par Chow K M

13 mai 2021

The quizzes should come with feedback on explaining the answers. It will greatly aid learning.

par Ryan B

6 juil. 2017

A good class with a good formal description and examples of game theoretic concepts.

par Koa Y

3 janv. 2019

Great course, I was really overdue but am hoping to get a certificate if possible

par Affandi I

13 avr. 2017

Great course, but I think It could be more vivid like its predecessor

par Roland R

10 janv. 2018

Great Course, same parts are challenging but i learned a lot about

par Hushan J

30 oct. 2017

it's better to give explanations of the quiz when it is passed.

par Daniel A M S

22 juin 2017

It was nice to have a second part with more specific subjects.

par Arshia S

11 nov. 2020

This course gave me amazing insight into game theory.

par Muhua X

11 sept. 2017

It is very challenging but also interesting

par Javier F G

14 mars 2021

The quizzes are not well designed.

par carlo p

2 sept. 2019

Excellent skills obtained

par Mufizul I

28 janv. 2017

Very nice

par Fred V

6 sept. 2020

Auction theory is left to the last lecture, and the influence of voting systems on political mechanisms is barely addressed. 3 different people lecturing, with different communication skills and flaws (hesitations, over-notating, abuse of acronyms), make following the course more difficult than it needs to be. These being said, it is clear that the authors more than know their stuff (at least the theoretical part; we would like to see them perform when bargaining in a souk) and bring a lot into the course.

par Cigdem K

15 oct. 2016

The exams did not explain why the wrong answers are wrong. Even after you succeed a test, I expect an explanation of the questions, and the correct answers. Even if I have a correct answer to a question, I don't know if my reasoning is correct..

par Telmo J P P

18 oct. 2017

Interesting, but not as good as part I. Some parts of the syllabus were not explained well enough: a lot of results just come out of thin air, and not a lot of intuitions are given.