Retour à Théorie des jeux II : applications avancées

4.7

385 notes

•

73 avis

Popularized by movies such as "A Beautiful Mind", game theory is the mathematical modeling of strategic interaction among rational (and irrational) agents. Over four weeks of lectures, this advanced course considers how to design interactions between agents in order to achieve good social outcomes. Three main topics are covered: social choice theory (i.e., collective decision making and voting systems), mechanism design, and auctions.
In the first week we consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making. We present some of the most important theoretical results in the area: notably, Arrow's Theorem, which proves that there is no "perfect" voting system, and also the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite Theorems. We move on to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences. We explain "mechanism design" -- a broad framework for designing interactions between self-interested agents -- and give some key theoretical results. Our third week focuses on the problem of designing mechanisms to maximize aggregate happiness across agents, and presents the powerful family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The course wraps up with a fourth week that considers the problem of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents, and that provides an introduction to auction theory.
You can find a full syllabus and description of the course here: http://web.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/GTOC-II-Syllabus.html
There is also a predecessor course to this one, for those who want to learn or remind themselves of the basic concepts of game theory: https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-1
An intro video can be found here: http://web.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/Game-Theory-2-Intro.mp4...

May 02, 2017

Very interesting! One missing thing: please write explanations for correct/incorrect questions in quizzes. In the basic course, I found them very helpful in understanding why my reasoning was wrong.

Sep 11, 2016

Outstanding course on Game Theory. Provides excellent mathematical and logical treatment of the concepts and theory. A perfect stepping stone for researchers willing to pursue their research in Gam

Filtrer par :

par Jie H

•Apr 16, 2019

This course could be better in many ways. However, I really appreciate the efforts the professors made to put up so much information into this short course. It opens many new worlds for me in the universe of game theory, and in particular, the Arrow's theorem is so astonishing that it almost refreshed my thinking on the mechanisms of voting.

par Carlos C

•Jun 28, 2019

The quality of the course is really high and I found it quite demanding, which is nice after the first course. It forces you to focus, review and think deeply about the meaning of the concepts. The exams are well-defined and they test properly the units. Some points aren't perfectly explained but that might be because the requirements for this course are quite high. Someone that is not used to mathematical notation would easily lose the track of the lessons. I hope that there'll be soon a Game Theory III.

par Georges R

•Sep 09, 2019

Really enlightening class!

I now feel empowered to create project management processes that encourage truthfulness and participation of its different stakeholders in my everyday job.

I also found some very interesting parallels with the methodology of pricing and notably price elasticity, which is key when designing a new product or its associated business model.

PS: Although I understand the importance of it being mathematically formalized, I would have loved it to be sometimes more concrete (especially through exercises and quizzes).

Thank you so much,

par Koa Y

•Jan 04, 2019

Great course, I was really overdue but am hoping to get a certificate if possible

par ZHU S

•Jan 11, 2019

The lecture are useful and the lecturer clear in their content and delivery. However, it would be better if more practices with answers can be given, and the tutorial should include questions of greater difficulty, such as those with real game settings and rules to solve for optimum strategy.

par Matthew W

•Nov 05, 2017

A lot of the important results were covered but sometimes results came out of nowhere (for example with optimal auctions and virtual valuations).

par Mufizul I

•Jan 29, 2017

Very nice

par Muhua X

•Sep 11, 2017

It is very challenging but also interesting

par Daniel A M S

•Jun 22, 2017

It was nice to have a second part with more specific subjects.

par R.Athindran

•Feb 23, 2017

Overall, the course was good. Somehow, the concepts were not as clear as the basic game theory course. Definitely more advanced.

par Roland R

•Jan 10, 2018

Great Course, same parts are challenging but i learned a lot about

par Hushan J

•Oct 31, 2017

it's better to give explanations of the quiz when it is passed.

par george v

•Feb 18, 2017

Great course. Nice retracing of some notions of the course Game Theory like Pareto Oprimality. Nice idea doing some examples on auctions and voting systems. Nice proofs

par Affandi I

•Apr 13, 2017

Great course, but I think It could be more vivid like its predecessor

par Ryan B

•Jul 06, 2017

A good class with a good formal description and examples of game theoretic concepts.

par carlo p

•Sep 02, 2019

Excellent skills obtained

par Telmo J P P

•Oct 18, 2017

Interesting, but not as good as part I. Some parts of the syllabus were not explained well enough: a lot of results just come out of thin air, and not a lot of intuitions are given.

par Cigdem K

•Oct 16, 2016

The exams did not explain why the wrong answers are wrong. Even after you succeed a test, I expect an explanation of the questions, and the correct answers. Even if I have a correct answer to a question, I don't know if my reasoning is correct..

par Jeppe v P

•Jun 08, 2017

Interesting material, but sometimes hard to follow the lectures.

par Carlos F S T

•Nov 15, 2017

No es tan bueno como el primero. Sin embargo, tomarlo como continuación es interesante.

par Martín B

•Sep 18, 2019

Should have much more real examples. Voting schemes was right, but mechanism design was completely abstract

par Mohammad Z

•Sep 09, 2018

poorly explained lectures. you're better off reading a textbook